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Vex not his ghost. 0 let him pass! he hates him
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer.
King Lear V, iii.

ELDER CHOICE
AND
COSTS
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hile strategists struggle with the dilemmas of health care, they seem to
overlook a practice that might simultaneously relieve the suffering of elder
patients and limit the costs of their treatment.
If elder patients were given a clear opportunity to choose, many might reject the
costly procedures that keep them breathing in misery during the last weeks, months,
and even years of their survival. Other elders who see the clouds of debility approach34

ing might be freed of the dread of endless imprisonment in a nursing home. Empowering elders to make these choices does not require changes in law, but only changes in
how we provide and finance care.
Health care for elders is cursed with two tragedies. One is that myriads of disabled
elders are imprisoned in hopeless, helpless debility and illness in nursing homes, mental
institutions and private homes. All they can look forward to is their eventual release by
death. Elders who have not yet reached that stage live in such dread of it that some seek
euthanasia or assisted suicide.
The second tragedy is the zooming costs of elders' health services, which impoverish
not only the patients themselves, but also the resources of Medicare and other insurance
that pays most of their medical expenses. The second tragedy results partly from the
first. If elders' imprisonment in debility were reduced, the costs of their health services
would also be diminished. Both tragedies might be mitigated by enhancing elders'
opportunities to refuse extreme medical procedures.
Elders can make choices about their care through documents generically called
"advance health care directives;" I call them simply directives. These are written and
signed declarations affecting future health care. Such documents are means of liberation
which, unlike euthanasia and suicide, avoid actively causing death. Unlike health care
rationing that denies care beyond a set age limit or medical condition, directives
conform to patients' own wishes. Whether the use of directives is ethical and whether
they are legally effective has been the subject of extensive recent discussion by leading
jurists, philosophers and physicians.
Directives usually cover medical procedures used to keep patients' hearts beating,
regardless of the quality of the life maintained. Health care practitioners call these
efforts "life support," while critics call them "prolonging death." "Life support" is, in
my view, a misleading ~uphemism because the condition that is supported often has
nothing in common with the qualities of activity and enjoyment-that are connoted by
"life." "Prolonging death" is equally misleading because what is prolonged is not
usually the process of dying, but survival in misery.
In the quest for a more neutral term, I have adopted "metabolic support" to describe
procedures that prolong breathing and blood circulation in patients who no longer
perform most of the other functions of living. Within metabolic support (or support for
short) I include cardiopulmonary resuscitation, artificial respiration, blood transfusion,
tube feeding and any other procedures that are used to intercept death rather than to cure
illness or relieve pain and misery.
Although directives are appropriate for individuals of all ages, I focus here on elders
because they are more likely and more able than younger people to weigh the plusses
and minuses of metabolic support. Resuscitation of 20-year-olds offers a very different
balance of prospective pain and gain than resuscitation of octogenarians. Directives
adopted at ages of 30, 40 or 50 are dubious guides to patients' intentions decades later.
The problems of directives adopted at ages of 70 or more call for separate analysis.

A VEN UES

What most patients
want is not to die, but to
limit what is to done to
them while they survive.

OF ESCAPE

Some elders are lucky e~ough to escape imprisonment in debility by the grace of
nature. Lou was one of these. At 75, he had been partially disabled by two previous
heart attacks. He suffered a third while sitting in his arm chair watching television. His
wife had retired early and did not discover him until morning, when he was beyond
rescue. "It was lucky," she said, " that I had gone to bed. If I had been awake, I would
have called an ambulance, and Lou would have survived in even worse shape than he
was in already."
In the view of his family and friends, Lou was lucky because he would have loathed
the aggravated debility in which he would have survived if rescued. He would have
grieved over the erosion of assets he had hoped to leave to his children. His wife was
lucky because she was spared the agony of trying to comfort Lou through the months or
years in which he would have survived in debility. A million other Medicare clients
35

Medicare could maintain a
national registry of
directives that health care
providers could access
through a toll-Jree number.
Although this would cost
money, it would probably
save Medicare more than it
would cost.

were lucky that their safety net was relieved of one of the weights stretching it to the
breaking point.
Most elders, along with their relatives and cohorts, are not so lucky. On losing
consciousness, patients are rushed to a hospital, where an army of technicians lavishes
technology on them before any questions are asked. Only after exhausting every
possibility of restoring some level of consciousness, which may take weeks, are
physicians likely to discuss with family members the suspension of support. Lacking
any indication of the patient's wishes, spouses and children cannot say no to continued
support without a deep sense of guilt, if they can say it at all. Some recent legislation
complicates the problem by requiring written certifications by family members and two
physicians to exclude cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
Elders can, however, improve their luck without confronting the ethical dilemmas of
euthanasia and suicide by prospectively refusing procedures that serve no purpose
beyond extending the duration of their debility. By the same act, they may spare their
families from burdens of useless anxiety and care, preserve their dwindling assets for
legacies to children or charities, and free health care resources for more productive uses.
People who want to have escape routes that are more reliable than nature, yet less
objectionable than euthanasia and suicide, must tum to advance health care directives.
Of these, the best known is the "living will," a term used loosely to designate a wide
variety of directives. Usually, a living will declares a willingness to be allowed to die in
designated conditions such as irreversible coma and terminal illness.
Another widely used form of directive is known to lawyers as a "power of attorney
for health care," and more colloquially as a proxy. A proxy authorizes someone other
than the patient to give or refuse consent for treatments when the patient is incompetent.
The proxy may specify the conditions in which it is to be exercised, or the procedures
that may be refused, but more commonly leaves these matters to the discretion of the
proxyholder. A proxy rooy be included in a living will document, but may also be
separate, especially in a state like Michigan that gives statutory force to proxies but not
to living wills.
A third type of directive has been developed by physicians at the Harvard and
University of North Carolina medical schools, which I call a "patient's choice." It
differs from a living will in that it does not express a wish or willingness to die, but a
wish to refuse specified treatments, even at the risk of death. Patients can state their
wishes about treatments ranging from antibiotics to cardiopulmonary resuscitation in
several specific medical circumstances such as an irreversible coma or terminal illness.
This form enables patients to indicate not only what treatments they refuse, but also
what treatments they desire. It relieves physicians, proxies and family members of
doubts about patient's wishes when they are called on to decide on support procedures.
A fourth type of directive is an unconditional veto of specified procedures without
regard to the patient's condition. The most prominent example is the veto of blood
transfusions used by Jehovah's witnesses. The same device can be used to forbid other
metabolic support procedures. Arizona has given statutory recognition to unconditional
vetoes on designated procedures such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, ventilation,
tube-feeding, and advanced life support medications, but requires that the veto be
countersigned by a physician.

THE ETHICS OF REFUSAL
In 1990, in the celebrated case of Nancy Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right to refuse metabolic support. Since that decision, the
focus of debate on refusal has shifted from legality to ethics. Are patients morally
justified in refusing procedures that would probably prolong their existence? Are
physicians, nurses, and hospital administrators morally justified in withholding treatment that elderly patients have refused?
Until the middle of the 20th century, these questions were generally irrelevant to the
human condition. When people's minds and bodies failed, they died. Now medical
36

technology has devised means of prolonging
metabolism far beyond the point at which it serves
utility or desire. The new technology presents
questions on which classical theology, philosophy
and ethics bear obliquely, if at all. It demands a
realignment of the ethics of life and death.
An examination of the ethics of refusing
metabolic support must begin with patients'
motivations. The clearest motivation is that of
Jehovah's Witnesses, who reject transfusions on
the ground that divine law forbids receiving blood.
Today, this motivation seems to be generally
accepted as ethical, even by commentators who do
not share the belief on which it is based. But it was
only a few decades ago that physicians and judges
presumed to decide that it was better for patients to
undergo transfusions that violated their faith than
to risk dying without them. Some judges still rule
this way when the patients are mothers of minor
children who do not have surrogate caretakers
ready and willing to replace the mother.
Transfusions may also be refused for fear of
infection. As recently as the mid-1980s, some
patients who accepted transfusions were infected
by the human immunodeficiency virus before
methods to screen blood for HIV antibodies were
perfected. Since viruses mutate, new strains could
infect future patients before they have been
detected. Patients may refuse transfusions not only
to protect themselves, but also to protect their
spouses and children.
Other refusals are commonly assumed to be
motivated by the desire to escape the misery of
pain, humiliation, and futility that may attend
extended treatment. Many elders suffer constant
discomfort and have very little enjoyment to
compensate for it. They are humiliated to be seen
in their wretchedness when visited, depressed by
loneliness when not visited, and oppressed continuously by a sense of uselessness.
Most contemporary ethicists seem to accept escaping misery as an acceptable
motivation. Although it is self-centered, it is not selfish in the sense of benefiting one's
self at the cost of others. One philosopher, however, has questioned whether fleeing
from misery violates the principle, expressed by St. Augustine and St.Thomas Aquinas,
that humans should accept the pain and suffering that are part of God's plan for them.
But it would be far-fetched to regard the tortures of high-tech metabolic support as part
of God's plan. Refusing artificial support seems consistent with Christian ethics when it
is conceived as accepting God's will, rather than as defying it. The Roman Catholic
Declaration on Euthanasis of 1980 allows withholding artificial prolongation of
existence when the burdens that it imposes on the patient and the patient's family
outweigh its benefits. Contemporary Jewish opinion is apparently divided.
Even if escaping misery is not a worthy motive, it coincides with altruistic motives
that may justify refusal. For many elder refusants, an unselfish motive of refusal is to
spare family and friends from the burden of supplying financial and social support that
patients are unable to reciprocate. A second altruistic motive is the desire of patients to
le.a ve whatever wealth they possess to their children, their churches, their charities or
their colleges, rather than consuming it in hospital and nursing home bills.
A third unselfish motive may be to avoid consuming scarce resources, including
37

blood, intensive care and the time of nurses and physicians, while thousands of children lack health care.
Receiving treatment under such circumstances may be
less worthy than refusing it.
Unworthy motives may motivate some refusants. One
can imagine rebellious adolescents refusing metabolic
support in order to make their parents feel remorse for
harsh discipline, or neglected parents refusing support in
order to inspire guilt feelings in their children. A
prisoner accused of crime was reported to have refused
tube feeding in order to avoid conviction and punishment. Most ethicists would presumably disapprove of
motives like these, although they generally escape
comment.

THE SUICIDE ANALOGY

•
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Suicide is widely condemned in Western society,
regardless of circumstances, and is categorically
condemned by Catholic and Jewish theology. Americans
who believe suicide is wrong may be troubled by the
question whether foregoing support is morally equivalent to suicide. The comments of a few judges have
suggested that it is.
In the Cruzan decision, Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia asserted that "starving oneself to death is
no different from putting a gun to one's temple." He
went on to state that refusing nutrition by bodily
invasion was not different from declining to feed one's
self. A quarter of a century earlier, Judge Skelly Wright
had made a less explicit identification of suicide with a
Jehovah's Witness' refusal of a blood transfusion.
If Justice Scalia and Judge Wright meant to say that
refusing metabolic support falls within the meaning of suicide as most people define it,
they were ignoring the best evidence of common usage. Webster's and Oxford dictionaries define suicide as "taking one's own life voluntarily and intentionally," which
connotes action, not passivity. Examples of suicide commonly cited in standard sources
such as the Encyclopedia Britannica are a Hindu widow casting herself upon her
husband's funeral pyre and a Japanese samurai disemboweling himself with his sword.
The most plausible explanation of Scalia's assertion is an implicit premise that any
decision that foreseeably leads to one's own death is suicide. By that test, a woman's
resistance to rape with a knife at her throat would also be suicide, as would Joan of
Arc's refusal to recant and a captured spy's refusal to reveal military secrets. Although a
woman's rejection of an unwanted feeding tube may seem to Scalia less noble than a
woman's rejection of an unwanted sexual intrusion, equating it with self-killing seems
absurd. Unsurprisingly, Scalia's fellow judges bypassed this equation without comment.
A more charitable interpretation of Scalia's and Wright's remarks would be an
assertion that forgoing support is infected with the same moral evils as suicide. In order
to evaluate this argument, one must find out why suicide is considered immoral. The
discovery is not easy, since suicide is generally mentioned as a horror without explaining why.
The Christian denunciation of suicide is commonly traced to St. Augustine, who
rejected the choice of death as a violation of God's dictates and his plan for the universe. This position stems from the view that birth and death, to a greater degree than
other human events, are provided by God and should not be rescheduled by humans. A
similar argument on the secular ground that suicide "cheats nature" is cited, although

not embraced, by Ronald Dworkin in his recent book, Life's Dominion.
If this is the basis on which suicide is denounced, it provides no argument against
forgoing artificial means of metabolic support. Refusing such support seems more
consistent with submitting to the plan of God or the law of nature than with rejecting
them. Resuscitation, blood transfusion, tube-feeding and injection of antibiotics are
more logically viewed as ways of arrogantly defying transcendental dispositions.
Another reason for denouncing suicide that might be extended to the refusal of
support is that it violates one's duty to contribute economically and psychologically to
family and to society. This argument applies forcefully to individuals who refuse
support while still in their productive years, at least until they are ascertained to be
incurable. But it seldom applies to refusals by elders, whose ability to contribute to
society or to their families is fading. Rather, consideration of the duty to contribute to
others points to the possibility that refusing metabolic support may be an elder' s most
ethical choice. This possibility is recognized by the Roman Catholic Statement on
Euthanasis, which firmly denounces suicide while permits withholding artificial
metabolic support that imposes burdens disproportionate to its benefits.
Conceding that foregoing support is not suicide and is not morally equivalent to
suicide, Yale Kamisar warned in 1989 (before the Cruzan decision) that approving the
refusal of support enters a slippery slope that has no safe barriers short of approving
suicide. The warning was soon vindicated by Sanford Kadish, who argued in the
Harvard Law Review that since refusing support is now permissible, suicide must be
equally so. Kadish conceded, however, that the permissibility of suicide could be
resisted on "plausible prudential grounds." Kamisar accepted as tenable the line drawn
by Cruzan between actively causing death and refusing to prevent it.
The "prudential grounds" that distinguish refusing support from suicide seem amply
sufficient to save courts from slipping inconsiderately from the former to the latter.
Since refusals are always prospective in some degree, they provi,de an interval for
change of mind; when made by advance directive, they give ample opportunity for
reflection and retraction. If advance directives are adopted in fits of depression, their
authors have opportunities to revoke them when the temporary depression passes.
Suicides, on the contrary, are irrevocable. The danger that rich uncles may be pressured
into suicides is inherently greater than the danger that they may be pressured into
adopting advance directives, which do not become operative until an emergency arises,
and may be revoked in the meantime.

REDIRECTING DIRECTIVES
The prospect of federal legislation that will make comprehensive health care
available to everyone, combined with an explosion of medical technology, gives a new
urgency to providing Americans with opportunities to refuse, as well as to receive,
medical treatment. The urgency is greatest in relation to elders, who have the most to
gain and least to lose by refusing medical procedures. In the following pages, I suggest
some basic ways of enhancing elders' choices.
EXPANDING AWARENESS AND ACCESS. All of the agencies that supply or finance health
care would serve the interests of their elder clients by providing them with means of
documenting their health care choices and information to guide their choices. The best
purveyors would be Medicare and Medicaid or their successors because they could
readily reach prospective patients long before they arrive at an emergency room. The
costs of disttjbuting information seem likely to be recovered by saving the costs of
unwanted procedures.

The forms of directive that elders are offered
should be better designed to express their wishes than the living wills that now commonly used. The very term "living will" suggests death, and the language of many of
the forms expresses the wish or willingness to die. What most patients want is not to

MATCHING DIRECTIVES WITH INTENTIONS.

If Medicare gave the
same attention to the
rights of patients that it
gives to the payment of
providers, it would
provide a space on the
back of the Medicare
card for notice of a
directive.

die, but to limit what is to done to them while they survive. Their desire is better
expressed by the instruments that I call "patient's choice." These declare what treatment
patients want to receive as well as what they want to refuse. Elders should also be
offered simpler options by which they might reject particular procedures such as blood
transfusion or feeding tubes without regard to their state of health.
NOTICE TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS. There is likely to be a wide gap of time and
distance between the adoption of a directive and the emergency in which it is applicable. Many directives will be filed in patients' desks, safe deposit boxes, or lawyers'
files. The documents may be lying in New York while their authors are lying in
hospitals in Florida or in highway towns between. For optimal effect, directives should
become known at the receiving desk of a hospital or clinic, including its emergency
room.
The chance that a directive will reach the awareness of hospital and ambulance staffs
can be enhanced by carrying notices of directives on pocket cards. For elders, the most
informative medium is the Medicare card, which will surely be examined by every
health care provider, probably even before treatment is administered. If Medicare gave
the same attention to the rights of patients that it gives to the payment of providers, it
would provide a space on the back of the Medicare card for notice of a directive.
Ideally, a card should not only give notice of a directive, but should also provide a
means for a health care provider to verify the terms of the directive. Medicare could
maintain a national registry of directives that health care providers could access through
a toll-free number. Although this would cost money, it would probably save Medicare
more than it would cost.
Since elders won't always be carrying pocket cards when emergencies occur, a
supplementary necklace, bracelet or anklet tag that gives notice of a directive and of a
toll-free number to call.for information would be useful. Emblems of this sort are
commercially sold, primarily to give notice of patients' allergies and medications.
Arizona's Do-Not-Resuscitate law expressly authorizes bracelet and anklet emblems on
which the words "Do not resuscitate" are printed on an orange background.

Alfred F. Conard is the Henry M.
Butzel Professor of Law emeritus.
An expert in corporate law, he is
also interested in the social and
economic consequences of law.

ACTIVATING HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS. In view of the benefits that directives offer
to elders and the economies that they offer to health care organizations and insurers, the
failure of these agencies to disseminate and popularize these devices is puzzling. These
agencies are probably deterred in part by the prevalent reluctance to incur the complications of withholding support and in part by the pressure of right-to-life activists.
Advocates of choice could probably move their cause forward by a change of labels.
In place of "living will," they could call their documents "medical directive" (the
Harvard group's selection) or "statement of patient's preferences" (the North Carolina
rubric). Organizations that aim to propagate the directives should reject names like
"Choice in Dying" in favor of something more like "Choice in Living."

*******
To serve their clients' fully, health care providers and insurers need to provide not
only means of maximizing health, but also means of minimizing misery and the dread
of misery. They can provide these means by distributing acceptable forms of advance
directives to their elder patients. When elders are provided with simple means of
escaping the torture of survival in debility, many will choose to reject fruitless treatments. Knowing that they have a means of escape, elders will be relieved of the dread
that drives some of them to embrace active euthanasia or assisted suicide.
While some elders are freed from unwanted ministrations, health care resources will
be freed to provide more treatment to elders who want them and to younger, more
viable patients who urgently need them.
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